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1 Introduction 
In this paper we introduce two mechanisms that implement the stable correspondence in 
a college admissions problem. These are stylized versions of contractual processes in bilat-
eral markets where monetary transfers are either irrelevant or can be embodied on agents' 
preferences. 
Matching markets have been extensively analyzed from a game-theoretical point of view 
(see Roth and Sotomayor [10] for a detailed state of the art until 1990). In this framework, 
Roth [8] and Alcalde and Barbenl [2] have shown the existence of incentives for agents to 
misreport their true preferences. These incentives appear when agents are faced with some 
mechanisms selecting allocations that satisfy certain "desired" properties. These results 
give us a reason to study the implement ability of stable solutions for the college admissions 
problem. 
Core correspondence implement ability in college admissions problems was first approached 
by Kara and Sonmez [6]. They showed that the core correspondence can be implemented in 
Nash equilibrium. However, they do not provide a simple mechanism that can be used in 
real life situations. They also show that no subselection of the core is Nash implement able. 
There are two problems that are still open in the college admissions problems framework. 
The first one is the design of natural mechanisms to solve the implement ability of the core, 
and the second one is the analysis of implement ability of core subselections. This paper 
provides positive answers to both of them. 
Alcalde [1] studied both questions for a particular case of matching problems, the mar-
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riage market problem. He provides some positive answers to the implementation problem 
using simple mechanisms. In particular, he implements the core correspondence. He also 
provides a mechanism to implement the extreme points in the core correspondence. 
A way to deal with the problem is to analyze simple real life mechanisms. Romero-
Medina [7] studies the mechanism employed by the Spanish University system to allocate 
new students to colleges. He shows that this mechanism can select unstable outcomes. 
While, core allocations would be reached when students behave strategically. This results 
cannot be applied to the more general framework in which we are interested on, since the 
matching procedure studied in [7] does not allow universities to behave strategically . 
. Let us now introduce the mechanism that implements the core correspondence in bilat-
eral matching markets. It is a procedure in which agents take decisions sequentially. In the 
first stage, students simultaneously send an application form to no more than one college. 
In the second stage, each college selects its best set of students, among applicants. Colleges' 
decisions determine the matching which results from agents interaction. Thus, the mech-
anism to be analyzed captures essential aspects which hold in real life college admissions 
problems. Firstly, we model sequential interactions among agents on both sides of the mar-
ket, reflecting an adjustment process to reach stable allocations. Secondly, agents on one 
side of the market (students) adopt an "active" role, making offers, whereas the aptitude 
shown by agents on the other side (colleges) can be considered as "passive": they only accept 
or reject the offers they receive. In fact, the mechanisms analyzed below reflect the idea of 
the classical algorithm developed by Gale and Shapley [4]. 
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Since our mechanism reflects a sequential decision process, the first equilibrium concept 
we study is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE). Therefore, our results can not be 
seen as a consequence of those obtained by Kara and Sonmez [6]. We are also interested in 
analyzing the effects of the agents' commitments when selecting the strategies to be played. 
Thus, we also analyze the outcomes that can be expected when agents select strategies that 
constitute a Strong Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SSPE) for this game. That is, 
strategies that are not only a SPE but also Strong Nash Equilibrium for this mechanism. 
Under such an equilibrium concept, this mechanism selects the students' optimal stable 
matching. This matching is the (unique) matching weakly preferred by every student to any 
other stable matching. 
Notice that the main feature of the mechanisms that we present in this paper is that they 
constitute reasonable proposals for effective design. Following Jackson [5], the mechanisms 
used to implement social choice correspondences should have "natural" features. Applica-
bility to real life situations can be one of these features. The mechanism we present in 
this paper satisfies this requirement, and furthermore it is traditionally used in many real 
life situations. There are two main reasons for that: first, it is straightforward to obtain 
the message space of each agent from its own preferences. Second, any individual is able 
to evaluate the consequences of her strategy without using a sophisticated analysis of the 
mechanism. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. 
Section 3 presents and analyzes the mechanism, to be called "the students-propose-and-
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colleges-choose" mechanism. Section 4 studies the effects of an interchange in agents' roles 
in the mechanism introduced in Section 3. Conclusions are in Section 5. 
2 The model 
Consider a college admission problem with n colleges and m students. Let C = {Cl, ... , Cn } 
and S = {SI, ... , sm} be the set of colleges and students, respectively. Each college has prefer-
ences, P (c) , over sets students. P (c) is assumed to be a linear order on 28. Each student's 
preferences, P (s) , is described by a linear order on C u {s }. A college admissions problem 
is fully described by a triplet { C, Si!: }, where!: = {P (Cl) , ... , P (en) ,P (SI) , ... , P (sm)} 
is a list containing a full description of the agents' preferences and is called a profile. 
An allocation for such a problem, or matching, is a mapping J1 from C U S into 28 U C 
satisfying 
(i) for all c E C, J1(c) E 28 , 
(ii) for all S E S, J1(s) E C U {s}, and 
(iii) for each pair (c, s) E C X S, [J1(s) = c {::=> S E J1(c)]. 
> From now on we will consider C and S to be fixed sets. Thus we can identify a college 
admissions problem {C, Si!:} with the preference profile !:.1 Let M be the set of all 
possible matchings J1. Finally, JP> denotes the set of (potential) matching markets. 
1 For the sake of simplicity, we use the same notation for a preference profile and for the related college 
admissions problem. The context will precise if p denotes a matching problem or simply a preference profile. 
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Let p be a matching market. Given a set of students A ~ S, we denote by Chc(A) the 
maximal element on 2A under the linear order P(c). 
Definition 1 A matching p, is said to be individually rational for P iff 
(i) Chc(p,(c)) = p,(c) for all eEC, and 
(ii) for all S E S, c E C [SP(S)c ==> S ~ p,(c)]. 
Definition 2 Let p, be a matching for p. We say that p, is blocked by a pair (c, s) E C x S 
iff 
(i) c P(s) p,(s), and 
(ii) SEChc(p,(c)U{s}). 
A pair (c, s) which satisfies the above two conditions is called a blocking pair for p,. 
Definition 3 Let p, be a matching for p. We say that p, is (pair-wise) stable if when is 
individually rational and there is no pair blocking it. Let N (!:) denote the set of stable 
allocations for the problem p. 
Finally, we assume that colleges' preferences, regarding to groups of students, are substi-
tutive. That is, for any two students s =1= s' if s belongs to Chc(A), then she will also belong 
to Chc(A \ {Sf}). This is an usual assumption in the related literature and it guarantees 
non-emptiness of the set of stable allocations (see Theorem 6.5 in [10]). Notice that when 
colleges' preferences are substitutive, the set of (pair-wise) stable allocations coincides with 
the core of that college admissions problem.2 That is, given a stable allocation, no group of 
2 Proposition 6.4 in Roth and Sotomayor [10] establishes that stability and pair-wise stability are equiv-
alent concepts in college admissions problems with substitutive preferences. 
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agents can find a matching to improve the utility of all its members without being matched 
with agents outside this group. Furthermore, if colleges' preferences satisfy substitutabil-
ity, the set of stable allocations has a latticial structure. This property guarantees (i) the 
existence of an unique stable allocation which is Pareto optimal from the point of view of 
students and, (ii) the existence of an unique allocation which is Pareto optimal from the 
point of view of colleges (when restricted to the set of stable matchings). 
The concept of implementation used throughout the paper is well-known in the literature. 
We next formalize this concept for both the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPE) and 
the Strong Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SSPE) cases. Let &k be the set of strategies 
for agent k and let & = X &x be the set of strategy profiles. Associated to each strategy 
xECUS 
profile e E & we can define a message profile m (e), or simply rn, which describes the action 
taken by each individual given the strategy they choose. A matching mechanism is described 
by the set of strategies available to each agent, and an outcome function, that assigns a 
matching to each profile of messages. We say that a matching mechanism implements a 
solution concept, say X, in the (Strong) Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if (i) for any e, 
(Strong) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game r := { C, S;!:;, }, ,(m (e)) belongs to 
X (!:) and (ii) for each fJ, in X (!:) there exists a (Strong) SPE for r, say et, such that 
,(m (et)) = fJ,. 
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3 The "students-propose-and-colleges-choose" mecha-
. 
nlsm 
This section is devoted to analyze a matching mechanism that mimics real-life matching 
procedures. In the mechanism we propose, each student selects the college in which she 
wants study. Then, once each college had received all its application forms, it accepts its 
most preferred set of students. 
Let us introduce the mechanism, that we are going to call the students-propose-and-
colleges-choose mechanism. This is a two-stage game. In the first stage, students have 
to decide. Each student's message space coincides with the set of colleges and she being 
unmatched, C U {s}. In the second stage colleges, knowing students' messages, select the set 
of students that they want to admit. Thus, each college's message space coincides with 28. 
Let m (k) denote the message of agent k E C U S, and in be an ordered vector containing 
the messages of all the agents. 
The outcome function, denoted by cp8C, selects a matching which is defined as follows: 
cp8C (in) = f.Lm, where for any s in S, 
I m(s) f.Lm (s) = s if sE m(m(s)) otherwise 
and, for each c in C, 
f.Lm (c) = {s E m (c) I c = m ( s )} 
Theorem 4 The "students-propose-and-colleges-choose" mechanism implements in SPE the 
core correspondence of college admissions problems. 
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Proof. First, we show that every SPE outcome is a stable matching relative to agents' 
preferences. Let in' be a SPE for r Sc := { C, Si !:i <I>sc }. One can check that, at the second 
stage, each college has a dominant strategy, namely rn' (c) = C he ( {s E Sic = rn' ( s ) } ).3 
Thus, <I>SC (in') should be an individually rational matching for p. 
Let us suppose that <I>sc (in') is not in N (!:), then there should be a blocking pair, say 
(c, s), in C x S. Since all the students play simultaneously, this can not be the case, because 
student s can reach higher utility by playing rn" (s) = c. Notice that, in the second stage, 
c's message has to contain such a student. A contradiction. 
On the other hand, let /-L be a stable matching for p. Let us consider the following 
~ 
strategies for the agents. Each student message (and strategy) is rn( s) = /-L (s). In the 
second stage any college's strategy is its dominant strategy, its message being rn( c) = /-L (c). 
This constitutes a SPE for the related game whose outcome coincides with /-L, which yields 
the desired result. I 
Since the Social Choice Correspondence that we study is the core, we analyze the influence 
of agents' behavior on the expected outcome when commitment is allowed. In such a case 
Strong Subgame Nash Equilibrium seems to be a minimal requirement to be fulfilled by our 
predictions. The analysis of such an equilibrium concept is the aim of Theorem 5. 
Theorem 5 The "students-propose-and-colleges-choose" mechanism implements in SSPE 
the students optimal stable allocation. 
3 Notice that such a strategy is not its unique best response. In fact, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for m(c) to be a college c's best response to students' strategies, m(s), is to satisfy that 
m (c) n {s E Sic = m( s)} = Chc ( {s E Sic = rn' (s)} ). Nevertheless, all these messages are strategically 
equivalent. Since we are interested in equilibrium payoffs rather than equilibrium strategies, we do not pay 
attention to these strategies. 
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Proof. First, we are going to show that the students' optimal stable matching can be 
supported by a SSPE. Let P be a matching market, and /-ts be its students' optimal stable 
allocation. Consider the following strategies: for any s in S, m (s) = /-ts (s) and, for each c 
in C, m(c) = argmaxP (c) on {s E S s.t. c = m(s)}. It is straightforward to see that these 
strategies constitute a SSPE whose outcome is /-ts. 
On the other hand, let rh' be a SSPE yielding /-t -:F/-ts as the outcome. We will show 
that it is not possible. Notice that every SSPE is a SPE. Thus, by Theorem 4, /-t has to 
be stable. Let denote S' := {s E S : /-ts (s) P (s) /-t (s)} the set of students preferring their 
allocation under /-ts rather than under /-t. Since /-t =1= /-ts, S' is non-empty. Now consider 
the following strategies: every s in S' plays m"(s) = /-ts (s), and any s in S\S' plays m' (s). 
Following the latticial structure of the core, it holds that m' (s) = /-ts (s) for all s not in S'. 
Given that colleges play their dominant strategies (see the proof of Theorem 4 above), the 
outcome when agents in S' shift their strategy and play m" (s) is /-ts. A contradiction. I 
4 The "colleges-propose-and-students-choose" mecha-
• nlsm 
This section introduces a mechanism implementing the core correspondence of college ad-
missions problems. The idea underlying this mechanism is very similar to the one analyzed 
in Section 3. In this case offers are made by colleges and each student selects her "best 
college", from the proposals she receives. That is, the main formal difference between this 
mechanism and the one studied in Section 3 is that we shift the order in which agents on 
both sides of the market make their decisions. 
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A formal description of the mechanism, named "the colleges-propose-and-students-choose" 
mechanism, follows. It is a two stage game. In the first stage, colleges have to decide simul-
taneously. Each college message space coincides with the set of potential teams of students, 
2S . In the second stage, students, knowing colleges' messages, select simultaneously the col-
lege in which they want to study. Thus, each student message space coincides with C u {s }. 
Let m (k) denote the message by agent k E C US, and in be an ordered vector containing 
agents' messages. 
The outcome function, denoted by ~CS, selects a matching which is defined as follows: 
~cs (in) = J1rh, where for any s in S, 
{ 
m(s) 
J1rh (s) = S 
if sE m(m(s)) 
otherwise 
and, for each c in C, 
J1rh (c) = {s E m (c) I c = m ( s )} 
The next result analyzes the equilibria outcomes of this mechanism when no commitment 
by agents is allowed. In some sense, the result can be interpreted as an equivalence between 
this mechanism and the "students-propose-and-colleges-choose" mechanism. The proof for 
Theorem 6, is omitted but it can be built in a similar way as the one for Theorem 4. 
Theorem 6 The mechanism described above implements in SPE the core correspondence. 
The relationship found between the mechanisms studied in Theorems 4 and 6 does not 
hold when agents are allowed to commit on deciding which strategies have to be played. As 
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Example 7 shows, cooperation among agents does not necessarily reduce the set of possible 
outcomes. 
Example 7 Let us consider the following five students and three colleges market. 
P(sd = c} 
P(S2) = C3C}C2 
P( S3) = C3C} C2 
P( S4) = C2C} C3 
P(S5) = C2C}C3 
P(C}) = S}S2S3S4S5 
P(C2) = (S2S3)(S4S5)S}S2S3S4S5 
P(C3) = (S4S5)(S2S3)SIS2S3S4S5 
It is straightforward to see that there is a Strong Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
yielding each stable matching. For instance, the matching f-ts in which f-ts (c}) = SI, 
on {C E C s.t. sE m(c)} U {s}. In a similar way, we can support the colleges' optimal sta-
m(s) = argmaxP(s) on {c E C s.t. sE m(c)} U {s}. 
5 Final Remarks 
This paper introduces two mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of matching 
markets. The results solve two essential questions. First, the core of such games can be 
implemented in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. And, second, it provides simple mechanisms 
to implement such a solution concept. 
The first mechanism that we introduce implements a particular selection of the core, 
namely the students' optimal stable matching. Thus, this paper also provides a positive 
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answer to the implement ability of a selection of the core in matching markets. Notice 
that Kara and Sonmez [6] prove that no selection of the core can be implemented in Nash 
Equilibrium. 
Unfortunately a symmetric result cannot be provided for the set of colleges. This result 
points out (as Roth [9] did) the asymmetry holding among both sides of the market. More-
over, we can also state, in the words of Roth, that "the college admissions problem is not 
equivalent to the marriage problem." Note that, in the particular case of marriage markets 
(colleges have only one position each), a symmetrical result for Theorem 6 can be stated by 
exchanging the role of students and colleges. 
To conclude, we want to mention that Alcalde, Perez-Castrillo and Romero-Medina [3] 
analyzed two mechanisms for job matching markets that were inspired in the mechanisms in 
this paper. They shown that, under some conditions, the results presented in this paper can 
be extended to the case in which monetary transfers play an essential role. Nevertheless, 
as the reader can see, the mathematical tools employed in bot papers are very different. 
So, even if the results in both papers have interpretative similarities, none of them can be 
considered a particular case of the other. 
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